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1. Introduction 
 Jekyll & Hyde were two different people inside the same person. Dynamically inconsistent 
people are the same. We are interested in how such people cope with this inconsistency. Do they 
realise that they are inconsistent, and, if so, how do they behave in the light of it? Are they naïve, 
sophisticated or resolute? A naïve person simply ignores his or her dynamic inconsistency; a 
sophisticated person takes his or her future behaviour into account when deciding in the present; 
and a resolute person just imposes his first period preferences on all future decisions.  For 
references to these terms, and a discussion of them, see Machina (1989) and McClennen (1990). 
Such considerations are important in two contexts: dynamic decision making under risk when 
people do not have Expected Utility preference functionals; dynamic decision making through time 
when people do not discount the future exponentially. The literature on the latter theme, particularly 
that relating to people with quasi-hyperbolic discounting (see, for example, Harris and Laibson 
2002), typically assumes that such dynamically inconsistent people resolve their inconsistency 
sophisticatedly. Whether they do or not is clearly of importance. 
 In the context of a simple life-cycle consumption model, we first develop the theoretical 
implications of these three types of responses, and then we explore experimentally which of these 
types is nearest to actual behaviour. As it is impossible to induce dynamically inconsistent 
preferences in the laboratory, we  explain how we implemented an experimental investigation in the 
laboratory with two people – one playing the role of Jekyll, and the other the role of Hyde.  
 
2. The Theory 
 We start with the following discrete period life-cycle story applied to a dynamically 
consistent individual. The individual receives an income M in every period. He or she has to decide 
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how much to consume C each period. Savings earn interest at the constant rate of return r. The 
probability of the problem continuing is ρ every period4. The per-period utility function is  
u(C) = C1/2 
and the individual wants to maximise expected (discounted) lifetime utility, given as in period t  by 
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The optimal solution takes the form5: 
 
2[ /( 1)] where (1 )C A W M r A rρ= + − = −  (2) 
where W denotes the stock of wealth at any time.  Thus the optimal strategy is to consume a 
constant fraction of ‘lifetime wealth’, namely W+M/(r-1), each period. 
 Now consider the same problem for a ‘Jekyll & Hyde’ individual. Such an individual 
alternates in that he or she has one objective function one period and a different objective function 
the next. We can implement this by assuming that the objective function in odd periods is given by 
equation (1) with ρ= ρ1 and that the objective function in even periods is given by equation (1) with 
ρ= ρ2 
6
.  We assume the same per-period utility function u(C) = C1/2.  If the individual is naïve, and 
therefore does not realise his or her dynamic inconsistency, then he or she uses equation (2) with  ρ
 
= ρ1 in odd periods and uses equation (2) with  ρ = ρ2 in even periods. If he or she is resolute, then 
he or she uses equation (2) with  ρ
 
= ρ1 throughout – with individual 1 somehow7 imposing his or 
her preferences throughout the lifetime. The interesting case is a sophisticated person – who is 
aware of his dynamic inconsistency and takes his future behaviour into account when deciding on 
his present behaviour. In this context, each individual takes into account the future decisions of the 
other individual when deciding what to do in the present. The solution8 to this problem takes the 
form 
                                                 
4
 Alternatively it can be considered an infinite horizon problem with discount factor ρ 
5
 A proof can be found in a Technical Appendix, available on request. 
6
 Alternatively, uses a different discount rate in odd periods from that in the even periods. 
7
 We do not inquire into how this resolute behaviour may be implemented. 
8
 A proof can be found in a Technical Appendix, available on request. 
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The values of α1 and α2 depend on all the parameters of the problem – specifically ρ1, ρ2 and r – and 
can be shown to the solutions of the equations 
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We note that the form of the optimal solution (equation (3)) is the same as the form in the individual 
case – equation (2) – but the average propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth is different. Note 
that even if ρ1 = ρ it is not the case that Α1 = A (if ρ2 ≠ ρ). The sophisticated player takes into 
account his or her other self when taking decisions. We give some specific numbers in the next 
section. 
 
3. The experimental Implementation 
 The difficulty with investigating this theory in the laboratory is that it seems to be 
impossible to appropriately incentivate a subject to be dynamically inconsistent. Normally one 
simply incentivates the subject by paying him or her the realised value of his or her objective 
function. However, a dynamically inconsistent individual effectively has two objective functions. It 
is clearly impossible to give one subject two different objective functions9. We get round this 
problem by having two subjects who play together, one taking the decision in the odd periods and 
the other in even periods. As in the theory, they get an income of M (units of experimental money) 
each period, and have to decide how much to consume/convert into real money each period. If they 
                                                 
9
 This is so even if one uses deception: one tells the subject in the first period that his or her objective function is one 
function and then in the second period one tells the subject “now you have a different function”, as it is crucial that a 
dynamically inconsistent person has two functions, and, in the case of sophisticated and resolute subjects, that they 
know that this is so. Nor can one tell the subjects that, in odd periods the continuing probability is ρ1 while in even 
periods it is ρ2 because by so doing one induces on them the preference function  
u(c1) + ρ1 u(c2) + ρ1 ρ2 u(c3) + ρ12 ρ2 u(c4) + ρ12 ρ2 2  u(c5) + …. 
which is not the preference function of a dynamically inconsistent person. 
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convert C in any period, they each get paid C1/2 in real money for that period. The odd player stays 
in the pair with probability ρ1 and the even player with probability ρ2. The only problem now is 
what happens when one player leaves the pair. Obviously this cannot stop the problem for the other 
player (for that would make the continuing probabilities the same) so we get round this problem by 
having in the laboratory 2n subjects divided into n projects each of the form of the above. When a 
subject leaves one project then he or she joins some other project – when a space becomes 
available. Then, to have an end point to the experimental session as a whole, we implement an 
‘earthquake’ which occurs with a given small probability at the end of each period10. When the 
earthquake happens all projects terminate. We have therefore reproduced the Jekyll & Hyde 
problem n times in the laboratory. We note that this is in a sense a ‘game’ between the two subjects 
in a project – but they do not have a conflict of interest (they both get the money converted whether 
by themselves or the other player) – rather they have a conflict of objectives. This is precisely the 
problem of a dynamically inconsistent person. 
 We implemented 4 different treatments, with different pairs for the continuing probabilities. 
The values, and the implied values of the average propensities to consume out of lifetime wealth, 
are given in Table 1. Note that Treatment 1 is not a case of dynamic inconsistency as the continuing 
probabilities are the same for both subjects in any project. We had the following numbers of 
subjects, projects and periods11: Treatment 1: 26 subjects, 13 projects, 35 periods; Treatment 2: 28 
subjects, 14 projects, 28 periods; Treatment 3: 28 subjects, 14 projects, 27 periods; Treatment 4: 24 
subjects, 12 projects, 25 periods; giving us a total of 106 subjects and 53 projects. 
 
4. Results 
 We carry out an examination of the question with which we started – are the subjects naïve, 
sophisticated or resolute? We can answer this question by comparing the mean absolute deviations 
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 Obviously the continuing probabilities have to take into account the earthquake. 
11
 The latter determined by the computer. 
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of actual conversion/consumption from the optimal conversion/consumption depending upon 
whether the subject was naïve, resolute or sophisticated. There is a slight problem here in that there 
are two possible scenarios that we can consider: Scenario 1: the optimal consumption throughout 
the life of the project; Scenario 2: the consumption that would be optimal given the wealth actually 
in the project at the time of the decision. We note that these differ because of suboptimal decisions 
made in the past. Table 2 reports these mean absolute deviations. Obviously there are no differences 
between the different types for Treatment 1 as this is not a case of dynamic inconsistency.  
 The notable features of this table are that the mean deviations are large and there is very 
little to distinguish the various types. On the whole, Sophisticated fits marginally better in 
Treatment 2, Resolute in Treatment 3 and Naïve and Sophisticated in Treatment 4. However, the 
differences are minor and clearly not significant. More importantly, since it is clear that these 
deviations are significantly different from 0, we can conclude that none of the three models 
represents the behaviour of our subjects.  
 One problem is the noisiness of the data. Figure 1, which is not a-typical, shows a particular 
project in Treatment 2. The thick jagged line is the actual path of the apc (average propensity to 
consume out of lifetime wealth) while the thin lower jagged line is the optimal apc for sophisticated 
subjects. It will be noted that the actual behaviour is much variable than the sophisticated optimal.  
 This figure does, however, show one important property: that generally, but not always, the 
subject who is playing Hyde (who has a lower continuing probability) converts/consumes more than 
the subject who is playing Jekyll (who has a higher continuing probability). If one looks at overall 
averages of the apc (the average propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth), one gets Table 3, 
which combines the actual data with the theoretical predictions from Table 1. We note that, except 
in Treatment 3, Hyde has a higher apc than Jekyll, as should be the case according to the theory 
whether the subjects are naïve or sophisticated.  
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 It is also clear that average propensities to consume are much larger than they should be. In 
Treatment 1, the apcs of Jekyll and Hyde are close to each other and around twice the theoretical 
value. In Treatment 2, the apc of Hyde is greater than that of Jekyll – as the theory predicts – as is 
also the case in Treatment 4, though in Treatment 3 the reverse is true. Thus there is limited support 
for the hypothesis that the continuing probabilities affected behaviour in the manner predicted by 
the theory, though in all cases the magnitude is considerably higher than the theoretical predictions. 
This could have resulted from risk-aversion on the part of the subjects.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper tries to answer the question: “ what do dynamically inconsistent people do about 
their inconsistency?”. Do they ignore it? – thus acting naively; do they impose their first period 
preferences? – thus acting resolutely; or do they take their future inconsistency into account when 
deciding in the present? – thus acting sophisticatedly. We have investigated these issues in the 
laboratory, in the context of a simple life-cycle model of saving, using a design in which two 
separate subjects play the two selves of a dynamically inconsistent person. Our results show little 
support for any of these three possible descriptions of behaviour, though there is evidence that 
subjects do take into account their circumstances when taking decisions. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that they take into account the circumstances of their other selves. This may be 
because our design necessarily involved transforming a game between the two selves in a dual 
personality into a game between two different people. Thus, in addition to having to consider the 
circumstances of the other, they have to take into account the behaviour of the other. It seems to 
have been the case that many subjects were consuming more than they should have been because 
they were worried about the behaviour of their other self – and possibly exaggerating the likelihood 
of the end of the experiment. It is not clear how one can get round these two problems: perhaps the 
first by getting human subjects to play with computerised ‘other selves’; and perhaps the second by 
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having an experiment with a finite number of periods. However, there remain residual problems: if 
one uses the computer to play the other self, one has to decide what to tell the human subjects as to 
how the computer is programmed12; and in a finite horizon problem, the optimal strategy changes 
from period to period. However, the bottom line of our experiment seems to be that the decision 
problem posed to the subjects is too complicated for them even to begin to consider whether they 
should act naively, resolutely or sophisticatedly. 
 
6. References 
Harris, C. and Laibson D. (2001) “Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers”, Econometrica, 69, 
935-957. 
Machina, M.J. (1989), “Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility Models of Choice Under 
Uncertainty”, Journal of Economic Literature, 27, 1622-68. 
McClennen, E.F. (1990), Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
                                                 
12
 And, indeed, whether they are told whether the computer is playing naively, resolutely or sophisticatedly – which 
may, in itself, change the behaviour of the human subjects. 
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Table 1: Average propensities to consume out of lifetime wealth 
continuing 
probabilities13 
naïve sophisticated resolute Treatment 
ρ1 ρ2 odd 
periods 
(Hyde) 
even 
periods 
(Jekyll) 
odd 
periods 
(Hyde) 
even 
periods 
(Jekyll) 
all periods 
1 0.85  0.85 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 
2 0.82 0.85 0.159 0.097 0.163 0.101 0.159 
3 0.85 0.88 0.097 0.032 0.104 0.040 0.097 
4 0.82 0.88 0.159 0.032 0.178 0.053 0.159 
 
 
Table 2: Mean absolute deviations from optimal consumption/conversion 
Naïve Sophisticated Resolute  
Treatment Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
1 157 162 157 162 157 162 
2 165 167 164 167 165 168 
3 171 174 168 171 157 160 
4 159 157 159 157 163 163 
 
 
Table 3: Average apcs by treatment and type of subject 
Theoretical Actual 
naïve sophisticated resolute 
 
Treatment 
Hyde Jekyll Hyde Jekyll Hyde Jekyll both 
1 0.184 0.178 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 
2 0.177 0.157 0.159 0.097 0.163 0.101 0.159 
3 0.157 0.173 0.097 0.032 0.104 0.040 0.097 
4 0.182 0.146 0.159 0.032 0.178 0.053 0.159 
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 These probabilities take into account the earthquake probability. 
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Figure 1: Consumption/Conversion in Project 19 
 
Notes: 
The thick (green) jagged line is the actual average propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth (apc) 
The thin (black) jagged line is optimal sophisticated apc. 
Working from the top the horizontal lines are the following: 
the first (dashed thick) is the actual average apc of the subject with the lower continuing probability 
the second (solid thin) is the optimal apc of the subject with the lower continuing probability if playing naively 
the third (dashed thick) is the actual average apc of the subject with the higher continuing probability 
the fourth (solid thin) is the optimal apc of the subject with the higher continuing probability if playing naively 
  
